Bullet-time in Simulation City: revisiting Baudrillard and The matrix by way of the "real 1999" by Laist, Randy
Title Bullet-time in simulation city: revisiting Baudrillard and The matrix by
way of the "real 1999"
Author(s) Laist, Randy
Publication date 2011
Original citation Laist, Randy. “Bullet-Time in Simulation City: Revisiting Baudrillard
and The Matrix by way of the 'Real 1999'”. Alphaville: Journal of Film
and Screen Media 2 (Winter 2011). Web. ISSN: 2009-4078.
Type of publication Article (peer-reviewed)
Link to publisher's
version
http://www.alphavillejournal.com/Issue%202/HTML/ArticleLaist.html
Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights ©2011, The Author(s)
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/692
Downloaded on 2017-02-12T06:38:56Z
1 
	  
 
 
Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media 
Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
 
 
 
Bullet-Time in Simulation City: Revisiting Baudrillard and The Matrix by way of the “Real 
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Abstract: The writers and directors of The Matrix famously claimed Jean Baudrillard as a source of inspiration for 
their movie, going as far as to feature a copy of Baudrillard’s signature book, Simulacra and Simulation, as a 
prominent prop in one of the movie’s first scenes. Baudrillard, however, explicitly disowned The Matrix as a 
representation of his worldview. When we follow the story of The Matrix from the perspective of the protagonist 
Neo, as the story compels us to do, we encounter a dualistic, Platonic division between reality and illusion which, as 
Baudrillard rightly observes, annuls the implosive dynamic that is the heart of the hyperreal condition. On the other 
hand, when we consider The Matrix from the perspective of its audience, the citizens of the “real 1999” (as opposed 
to the simulacral 1999 generated by the Matrix), we find late-century American culture refracted back to us as the 
kind of world that lends itself to “neural-interactive simulation.” By performing a reading of The Matrix that 
emphasizes its reference to its contemporary historical moment, we can identify a sense in which the film 
authentically captures a Baudrillardian variety of space-time. 
 
 
   In one of the most interesting conversations to open up between philosophy and pop 
culture in recent decades, the Wachowski brothers, writers and directors of the popular science-
fiction film The Matrix (1999), identified French cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard as a primary 
source of inspiration for their story, even going so far as to feature a copy of Baudrillard’s most 
famous book, Simulacra and Simulation (1994), as a prominent prop in one of the film’s first 
scenes and quoting the now-famous expression “the desert of the real” from the first page of that 
publication. Baudrillard, however, explicitly disowned the film as a representation of his 
thinking, going so far as to indicate that The Matrix is the kind of film the evil Matrix 
programme would make about the Matrix. The basic disjuncture between the narrative of The 
Matrix and Baudrillard’s philosophy in his seminal texts of the 1980s and 1990s concerns the 
manner in which reality is structured. The clear philosophical debt in the Wachowski brothers’ 
film is to Plato and the condition he describes in the Allegory of the Cave, in which prisoners of 
a false reality are freed to discover that there is a true reality the existence of which they had not 
suspected. The foundational insight of Baudrillard’s theory in Simulacra and Simulations, 
however, is that the Platonic duality between reality and representation has imploded in the 
modern world, resulting in a hyperreal condition to which criteria of truth or falsity no longer 
apply. As Baudrillard himself explains in an interview, “the real nuisance in this movie is that the 
brand-new problem of the simulation is mistaken with the very classic problem of the illusion, 
already mentioned by Plato. Here lies the mistake” (Lancelin). 
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When we follow the story of The Matrix from the perspective of the protagonist Neo 
(Keanu Reeves), as the film compels us to do, we encounter a dualistic, Platonic division 
between reality and illusion. In that film, the real world is the devastated hellscape of 2199. The 
world of illusion, however, is a simulated replica of 1999, the year in which The Matrix was 
released. As a result, the film also invites us to read it from the perspective of the inhabitants of 
1999. Agent Smith (Hugo Weaving) explains that the machines selected this historical period to 
simulate because it represents the peak of human civilisation, and the inhabitants of the Matrix 
apparently live in an eternal 1999, literally living out Baudrillard’s pataphysical claim that “the 
year 2000 will not perhaps take place” (Illusion 9), that time would distend to infinitely defer the 
millennial moment. But, even more strangely, when we consider The Matrix from the 
perspective of the citizens of the “real 1999”, we find the millennial moment refracted back to us 
as the kind of world that lends itself to “neural-interactive simulation”. The urban skyscraper-
scapes, cubicle-scapes and media-scapes that constitute the Matrix manage to mimic 
contemporary American reality, while simultaneously suggesting that these are the kinds of 
environments an evil computer programme would design for human beings to inhabit. The 
Matrix world emphasises important technological innovations of the late 1990s—including cell 
phones, the World Wide Web, and CGI cinematography—all of which, it is implied, contribute 
to the derealisation of conventional models of space and time. An important difference, however, 
between the inhabitants of the Matrix and the citizens of the “real 1999” is that the inhabitants of 
the Matrix can wake up into reality, whereas the inhabitants of “real 1999” are stranded without 
hope of escape in a time and place that is immanently simulacral. In this sense, the fictional pod-
people of 2199 are more real than we are. Reality is at least possible for them, whereas we are 
trapped in a kind of reality that is its own simulation. In Baudrillard’s words, we can say of the 
ontology of the “real 1999” that “[i]llusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer 
possible” (Simulacra and Simulation 19). By performing a reading of The Matrix that 
emphasises its roundabout reference to its own contemporary historical moment, we can identify 
a sense in which the film authentically captures a Baudrillardian variety of space-time. 
 
 
How Do You Define “Real?”: At Home in the Matrix 
 
It is significant that Baudrillard’s response to The Matrix refers both to the original 1999 
film and its 2003 sequel, Matrix: Reloaded. Although they are obviously similar in many 
respects, The Matrix belongs to a different historical moment than its two sequels, and can 
almost be considered to belong to a different genre. The major historical turning point between 
1999 and 2003 is, obviously, 9/11, which, conflated as it easily is with the advent of a new 
calendric millennium, acquires the status of a historical-cultural turning point in the popular 
imagination. Considered within the context of its original release, The Matrix is the crowning 
example of several interrelated trends in Hollywood movies of the 1990s. Most obviously, The 
Matrix is the most commercially successful of a wave of cyberpunk films, including Total Recall 
(Paul Verhoeven, 1992), The Lawnmower Man (Brett Leonard, 1992), Johnny Mnemonic 
(Robert Longo, 1995), Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 1995), Ghost in the Shell (Mamoru 
Oshii, 1995), Cube (Vincenzo Natali, 1997), Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998), The Thirteenth 
Floor (Josef Rusnak, 1999), eXistenZ (David Cronenberg, 1999) and Vanilla Sky (Cameron 
Crowe, 2001). All of these films use the metaphor of a computer-generated world as a way of 
imagining the manner in which it is possible for human beings to exist in alternate ontological 
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registers. Even though each of these cyberpunk narratives establishes its own mythology of how 
reality is structured, taken as a whole, the proliferation of these films suggests an increasing 
cultural inquiry into the phenomenological issues associated with a new kind of mediated reality. 
Another cinematic trend within which we can position The Matrix is that of ironic meta-movies, 
movies that self-consciously incorporate their status as pop-cultural products into their own 
thematic and narrative structure, such as The Brady Bunch Movie (Betty Thomas, 1995) and its 
sequel, A Very Brady Sequel (Arlene Sanford, 1996), Scream (Wes Craven, 1996) and its sequels 
(Wes Craven, 1997, 2000, 2011), the Pierce Brosnan instalments of the James Bond franchise—
GoldenEye (Martin Campbell, 1995), Tomorrow Never Dies (Roger Spottiswoode, 1997), The 
World Is Not Enough (Michael Apted, 1999), Die Another Day (Lee Tamahori, 2002)—and 
South Park: Bigger, Longer, and Uncut (Trey Parker, 1999). The defining feature of this 
subgenre is that the films’ characters inhabit a reality that has the ontological status of a 
television show or film. These films reflect a situation similar to that depicted in Pleasantville 
(Gary Ross, 1998) and The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998), in which human reality has 
become “televisualised”, depleted of the existential and humanist values associated with the 
classical understanding of reality and reorganised according to the values of mass-media culture. 
Encompassing both the cyberpunk films and the meta-movies is a wider cultural-cinematic trend 
of films that engage in one way or another with the Baudrillardian theme of the implosion of 
reality and representation. Seminal films of “the long 1990s”, such as JFK (Oliver Stone, 1991), 
Terminator 2: Judgment Day (James Cameron, 1991), True Lies (James Cameron, 1994), The 
Player (Robert Altman, 1992), Jurassic Park (Steven Spielberg, 1993), Natural Born Killers 
(Oliver Stone, 1994), Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis, 1994), Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 
1994), Face/Off (John Woo, 1997), Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999), and Being John 
Malkovich (Spike Jonze, 1999), all engage with the problems and possibilities associated with 
the new style of reality that emerges following the collapse of the Cold War and the advent of 
simulacral technologies such as cloning, virtual reality and digitisation. Considered from within 
the context of these prevailing trends, The Matrix clearly holds a privileged place in the canon of 
1990s hyperreality cinema. 
 
The Matrix’s two sequels, however, are distinctly post-9/11 movies. In accordance with 
the prevailing cinematic mood in the decade following 9/11, the sequels to The Matrix do in fact 
distance themselves from endorsing a hyperreal ontology. They are fraught with history and 
consequence in deference to the rebooting of reality that the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the subsequent War on Terror have come to represent. Baudrillard’s response to the 
dramatic situation represented in The Matrix may have been influenced by his familiarity with 
the direction the franchise would take in its twenty-first century incarnation. When we consider 
the first Matrix film in isolation, however, the delineation between reality and hyperreality is 
much more ambiguous than it becomes in its post-9/11 instalments. Whereas the sequels shift 
their focus away from the computer world and toward the “real” world of the rebel city of Zion, 
almost all of the first film’s plot and the vast majority of that film’s memorable action sequences 
take place inside the Matrix or other computer-generated environments. By introducing the 
Matrix as a naturalistic environment and by impressing the audience with the vividness and 
persuasiveness of the virtual world, the first film evokes a sense that the virtual landscape is also 
a real dwelling place, whereas the supposedly “real” city of Zion is never anything more than a 
rumour. Throughout the first forty-five minutes of The Matrix, we accept Neo as an ordinary 
inhabitant of a world that, while highly stylised, consists of recognisable signposts of 
4 
	  
 
 
Alphaville: Journal of Film and Screen Media 
Issue 2, Winter 2011 
contemporary urban existence. The acceptance of this world as the familiar world of the 
audience accounts for the uncanny effect of the later scenes in which we return to it with the 
awareness that it is a mass-induced simulation, prompting an experience of defamiliarisation that 
is rooted in the underlying recognisability of Neo’s world as a version of our own. The Matrix is 
the heart of The Matrix; the “real world” scenes in the Nebuchadnezzar have a perfunctory mood 
and a flat visual style, whereas the Matrix scenes spill over with the innovative cinematographic 
effects and spectacular action sequences that reflect the film’s true raison d’être. Even Morpheus 
(Laurence Fishburne), the rebel leader who is committed to destroying the Matrix, seems more 
interested in the plasticity of human potential as it exists within a simulated environment than he 
is in pursuing Zen discipline in his real body in 2199. In his training scenes with Neo, Morpheus 
flows over with the jouissance of his intra-matrical athleticism, and all of his cryptic wisdom 
seems to apply solely to the condition of living in a neural-interactive simulation. Neo 
downloads a cerebral programme and reports that he “know[s] kung-fu”, but, as far as we can tell 
from the first Matrix movie, he does not really know kung-fu in terms of being able to do it in 
reality, he only knows it in the videogame world or, rather, he only “knows” it mentally, not in 
the sense of the mind-body fusion that is the real perfection of martial arts training. In this sense, 
the rebels who are revolting against the artificial Matrix-world actually define their standards of 
knowledge and wisdom according to intra-matrical conditions.  
  
The climax of the film, furthermore, puts the ontological status of the “real world” itself 
into question. Morpheus had told us definitively that death in The Matrix results in real-life 
death. This rule is supposed to be a rule of physiology—of “reality”—as opposed to a virtual rule 
that can just as easily be annulled by reprogramming. When Trinity (Carrie-Anne Moss) and 
Neo’s love proves potent enough to resurrect Neo back from the dead, this event bypasses the 
laws of physical reality rather than the virtual laws of the Matrix. Someone who had not seen the 
sequels would be justified in theorising that what Trinity and Neo think is the “real world” is 
actually only another computer programme. Slavoj Žižek, for one, found it likely that “[i]n the 
sequels to The Matrix, we shall probably learn that the very ‘desert of the real’ is generated by 
another matrix” (245). Immersing us as it does in the world of the Matrix, the first film opens the 
floodgates of a vertiginous scepticism that undermines any foundation for a stable reality. The 
point of view of the next two films, however, puts the audience on the side of “reality” against 
the evil machines, and the franchise returns us to the Matrix only as tourists. The sequels never 
return us to a sense that the Matrix is where we are comfortable and at home. For this reason, the 
first Matrix is a much more effective metaphor for the condition of hyperreality than its sequels.  
 
In particular, the very last scene of The Matrix emphasises Neo’s commitment to working 
within the Matrix to raise the consciousness of its inhabitants, among whom, it is understood, is 
the audience itself. In his parting statement to the machines, Neo pledges that he will show the 
inhabitants of the Matrix “a world without rules and controls, without borders or boundaries, a 
world where anything is possible”. What world is he talking about? This is certainly not a 
description of the “real world” of 2199, a world characterised by remorseless military discipline 
and the constant threat of death. Rather, Neo seems to be describing the fantastic possibilities 
that can result from manipulating the code of the imaginary world. Once one cracks the code of 
the Matrix, as Neo does, intra-matrical reality becomes available for an endless variety of 
visually arresting permutations. None of these hallucinatory effects, however, has anything to do 
with liberation from the Matrix. We are told several times during the film that nothing you can 
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do or see in the Matrix can provide awareness of the true nature of the Matrix. Liberation 
requires nothing more dramatic than swallowing a red pill, upon which one disappears from the 
Matrix to see for oneself the true infrastructure of the illusory dream-world. It is difficult to 
imagine how Neo will use his intra-matrical flips and twists to liberate anyone from enslavement 
to the machines, and even his most mind-bending acrobatics will be useless if his unconscious 
body is vaporised by Squiddies while he’s flying around in the dream-world. Indeed, within the 
logic of the Matrix universe, Neo’s peroration makes little sense, since the goal of Morpheus’s 
resistance movement is supposedly to liberate people from the Matrix, not to convince them how 
cool it can be to live in a Matrix if you go about it the right way. Neo’s statement only makes 
sense if we take it to apply to us, the audience, living in the “real 1999”, with no real world to 
wake up to. The possibilities of intra-matrical miracle-working signify nothing more than an 
absurd game in 2199 but, in 1999, they represent vivid metaphors for the power of the 
imagination to transform a simulacral world and, indeed, they do seem to echo Baudrillard’s 
assertion that “it is in this tactical universe of the simulacrum that one will need to fight—
without hope, hope is a weak value, but in defiance and fascination” (Simulacra and Simulation 
152). If most viewers don't even notice that Neo is operating at cross-purposes at the end of the 
film, it is most likely because the subtext, taken for granted, is that he is talking to his 1999 
audience rather than his 2199 audience. 
 
 
The Peak of Your Civilisation: The Mirror-function of the Matrix 
 
We members of the “real 1999” do in fact make a cameo appearance in The Matrix. 
Morpheus explains to Neo the truth about the reality of 2199 in a simulated environment known 
as the Construct. In this cyberspatial environment, Morpheus is able to call upon a number of 
visual aids to assist his apocalyptic narrative, one of which is an old 1950s-style Radiola 
television set. “This is the world you know”, Morpheus tells Neo, “the world as it existed at the 
end of the twentieth century”, clicking on the kitschy television to show a Koyaanisqatsi-style 
montage of urban footage: skyscrapers, highway traffic and bustling crowds of rush hour 
pedestrians that we instantly recognise as a representation of our own civilisation. Televisions 
feature prominently in The Matrix as well as in Baudrillard’s writing. In the Matrix, we see Neo 
appear on a bank of television screens when he is being interrogated by Agent Smith, for 
example, and Apoc (Julian Arahanga) and Switch (Belinda McClory) die in a television repair 
shop. In the symbolic landscape of the Matrix, television screens coexist alongside mirrors and 
other reflective surfaces to suggest the extent to which intra-matrical objects are both imaginary 
(in the sense of being images rather than substances) and replicable. It is fitting then that the film 
uses a television screen to present its audience with a mirror-image of themselves. Baudrillard’s 
philosophy of hyperreality has been called “a conspiracy theory based almost entirely on an 
analysis of television” (Cook 160), as in his likening of television to “a miniature terminal that, 
in fact, is immediately located in your head—you are the screen, and the TV watches you—it 
transistorizes all the neurons and passes through like magnetic tape” (Simulacra and Simulation 
51). For Neo, watching television in the Matrix (or the Construct), it is literally true that the 
television is in his head, along with everything else in his perceptual environment. For us, 
watching Neo watch television, we see ourselves depicted as a televisual montage. “This is the 
world you know”, Morpheus tells Neo, not “This is a representation of the world you know”. It 
may be somewhat distorted for having travelled 200 years both ways to reach us, but this strange 
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mirror image turns out to be just as identifiable to us as a representation of “contemporary 
civilisation” as the self-consciously retro appliance is identifiable as a “television”. Seeing 
ourselves through the mirror of a televisual montage compiled by historians of the distant future 
is a uniquely Baudrillardian style of self-perception, one that emphasises the extent to which 
reproduced images play a decisive role in defining the popular understanding of contemporary 
reality. This mirror-function of The Matrix corresponds closely with Žižek’s observation that 
symbolic fictions are a key element in the regulation of reality itself. In his discussion of The 
Matrix in The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema (Sophie Fiennes, 2006), Žižek famously requested “a 
third pill”, a pill which would enable one to see “not the reality behind the illusion, but the reality 
in illusion itself”. While both Žižek’s and Baudrillard’s critical perspectives effectively 
problematise the Platonic dualism of a naïve interpretation of The Matrix, Žižek’s recourse to the 
unconscious provides his psychoanalytic reading with a stable frame of reference according to 
which the categories of real and illusory can be discriminated, whereas Baudrillardian 
hyperreality is characterised by a more radical collapse of ontological registers. The vision of our 
reality we glimpse through Morpheus’s magic mirror reflects Baudrillard’s definition of the real 
as “not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced: that is, the 
hyperreal” (Simulations 146). 
 
 
 
The citizens of the “real 1999” make a cameo appearance in The Matrix (1999) 
 
 
The images on the television and the Matrix world itself are both densely urban 
environments. Even if Neo’s world were not a neural-interactive simulation—that is, if his world 
really were our world—he would still live in a space that is entirely artificial. Neo moves 
through apartment buildings, hotels, office buildings, subway stations, city streets and other built 
spaces, and it is difficult to remember if there is anything so much as a single plant in the whole 
film to break the consistency of inorganic shapes. Neo’s apartment is a sleeping-cube 
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reminiscent of the amniotic pod that his “real” body inhabits, and the array of skyscrapers in 
which he works mimics the design of the towers in which these pods are arrayed. 
Architecturally, Neo’s real world and the Matrix world seem to mirror one another. When Neo 
has to flee the Agents at his office, he ducks and weaves through a maze of cubicles, the right 
angles and straight lines of which reinforce the audience’s impression that he lives in a world 
invented by machines. When Neo falls into the Agents’ custody, we see his image replicated on a 
grid of television monitors, and the interrogation room itself is a hell of squares, a graph-paper 
world. The most characteristic shade of lighting in the Matrix scenes is a tint of green that is not 
the chlorophyll green of organic life, but the moribund, pallid green of bureaucratic waiting 
rooms and fluorescent lights. All of these visual components are cues to the audience (if not to 
Neo) that the Matrix world is simulated according to the mechanical principles of regularity and 
repetition and is not a natural space. It turns out, however, that Neo’s world looks the way it 
does, not because it was designed by computers, but because it is modelled on our world, 
allowing us to recognise in Neo’s unnatural Matrix world a representation of our own 
contemporary habitat. The sense in which Neo’s world is simulated by computers parallels the 
sense in which our world—the world that Neo thinks he lives in—is itself simulated by 
computers according to the same principles of rationalised efficiency that govern machine-logic 
in all times and places.  
 
Whether or not any given member of the 1999 audience of The Matrix lives in a place 
that physically resembles the unnamed city of the Matrix, as consumers participating in global 
mass-culture, the basic semantic structure of their cultural environment is identical to that of the 
Matrix. In the same way that the eternal 1999 of the Matrix simulates the Baudrillardian claim 
that America “lives in a perpetual present” (America 76), the spatial quality of the Matrix is 
similarly closed off. The entire world seems to consist of a single city that no one ever leaves and 
outside of which nothing seems to exist. This aspect of life in the Matrix suggests a centripetal 
self-referentiality that is reminiscent of the closed circuit of global capitalism. As surreal as the 
spatio-temporality of the Matrix may be, the same tropes of closed space and time are at the 
foundation of Baudrillard’s analysis of contemporary reality. As William Bogard explains in his 
commentary on Baudrillard, “simulation is the cancellation of distance, space, and, ultimately 
(linear, historical) time itself, and the substitution of simulated distances, simulated times, etc.” 
(317). The simulation of time and space is made possible, in both Baudrillard’s theory and the 
narrative world of the Matrix, by the replacement of “the metaphysic of being and appearance” 
with the metaphysic of “the code” (Simulations 103). Indeed, Baudrillard could be describing the 
Matrix itself when he explains that, through the power of digitisation, “[t]he real is produced 
from miniaturised units, from matrices, memory banks, and command models” (Simulation 3). 
The opening shots of The Matrix stage a literal depiction of digital code—represented by the 
film’s motif of streaming columns of data—taking the form of the physical hotel corridors 
through which the police force close in on Trinity. The Matrix is a world literally built out of 
information and, as a result, it is a densely semantic environment. As in any built space, every 
aspect of every artificial object has meaning—it was designed by someone (or something) with 
reference to economic, aesthetic and cultural values. The semantic landscape is therefore a 
paranoid environment in which nothing ever simply is, but in which everything speaks. 
According to Baudrillard, “[t]his approximates our general attitude toward the world around us 
to that of a reading, and to a selective deciphering. We live less like users than readers and 
selectors” (Simulation 121). Everything in the Matrix environment is freighted with significance. 
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If Neo could read the signs of his coded world, he might be able to interpret the truth about the 
Matrix’s nature. Neo even recognises a veiled clue in the banal “have a nice day”, uttered by 
Mouse (Matt Doran) when he is posing as an intra-matrical mail courier. The Matrix shares the 
semiotic quality of our late-capitalist terrain, in which “nothing is inert, nothing is disconnected, 
uncorrelated, or aleatory. Everything, on the contrary, is fatally, admirably connected” (Fatal 
Strategies 185). The significant difference, however, is that whereas the signs in Neo’s world all 
indicate a single sacred Truth—that the Matrix is a ploy—the meanings in the Baudrillardian 
hyperscape have no such transcendent interpretation, referring rather back to themselves in an 
orbital precession. In general, the metaphor of the Matrix dramatises a very accurate rendition of 
Baudrillard’s description of contemporary reality, failing only in its portrayal of the Matrix as an 
illusion, but this nuance, as important as it may be to Neo, is irrelevant to us, for whom the 
Matrix, however unreal it may be, is not an illusion.  
 
 In addition to replicating the “real 1999” in terms of its spatio-temporality and its 
semantic structure, the Matrix also mirrors back to its audience the social conditions of its own 
time. In his review of postmodern themes in The Matrix, David Weberman speculates that living 
in a matrix might be an improvement on real-world conditions, in that it facilitates “the 
elimination of poverty (for we see mainly business types and we mustn’t forget that the machines 
want a docile human population and would be unwise to permit hunger and predation)” (233). 
When we consider the Matrix in terms of its 2199 function—to distract pod-people from their 
real existence—Weberman’s supposition is logical, but if we consider the Matrix in terms of its 
1999 function—to mirror back to us our contemporary moment—a more recognisable version of 
1999 conditions is more appropriate. Indeed, while many scenes seem to be set in affluent 
business districts, the Matrix also features working-class and underclass neighbourhoods of 
Megacity and is populated by lumpenproletariat individuals (such as the hobo in the subway 
station or the blind man in the lobby of the Oracle’s (Gloria Foster) apartment building). The fact 
that the Matrix is not a utopia is explained within the film by Agent Smith, who relates that the 
machine’s original Matrix design was intended to be a perfect world, but that the human brain 
was not equipped to process an existence devoid of pain and suffering. To the audience, 
however, the social imperfection of the Matrix relates to two different conditions: that of reality 
in 2199 and that of “reality” in 1999. This referentiality is cleverly indicated in an early scene in 
which Neo is reprimanded by his boss for chronic tardiness and a generally uncooperative stance 
toward corporate life. We have already noted that Neo’s skyscraper workplace recalls the towers 
of pods in the machine’s bioenergy fields. His boss, Mr Rinehart (David Aston), furthermore, in 
his tone of voice, his clothes and appearance, and his proposal to Neo that he has a choice to 
make—this job or another one—echoes the Agents, who exhibit dehumanised speech patterns, 
standardised appearance and also propose a choice to our hero—life as Neo or life as Thomas 
Anderson. The parallelism between Neo’s boss, himself supposedly another human battery 
dreaming in a pod, and the Agents, the personified enforcers of intra-matrical behaviour, 
suggests that life for Neo as a worker in a simulated capitalist environment is identical to his life 
as an amniotic pod-person. Throughout this scene, workers are cleaning the windows outside Mr 
Rinehart’s office, the squeaking of their squeegees punctuating the dialogue. This obtrusive 
window washing seems intended to communicate an overt message to the audience, over the 
heads of the film’s characters, about how transparently the scene renders the metaphorical 
relationship between Neo’s job and his existential status as a slave of the machines. “Do I make 
myself clear?”, Rinehart asks at the end of the scene. “Yes, Mr Rinehart, perfectly clear”, 
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answers Neo. But, because Neo’s world is a simulated version of our own, this winking gesture 
to the audience also clarifies the implication that the transparency of the metaphor cuts through 
three realities: 2199, the Matrix, and our own. The metaphoricity that links Neo’s job to his 
status as a human battery is itself a metaphor for the extent to which we ourselves in 1999 are 
immersed in power structures that are both simulacral and dehumanising. If the machines were 
really super-intelligent, they would simply give Neo a more fulfilling career as a way of 
deterring him from his restless searching (as Weberman rightly argues they would be wise to do 
(233)). Depicting a more utopian world, however, would disrupt the transparency of the mirror-
function of the Matrix for its 1999 audience.  
 
 
Never Send a Human to Do a Machine’s Job: Technology in 1999 and 2199 
 
The most significant theme traversing the Matrix world, the 2199 world and the “real 
1999”, is that of technology. The first time we see Neo in the film, he is asleep in front of his 
computer, listening to techno music through his headphones. The pale glow of the computer 
monitor, lined with the shadows of scrolling text and images, plays across Neo’s arm and face, 
suggesting that his very flesh is a digital effect. Of course, as we discover, this is precisely the 
case, as it also turns out to be the case that his sleeping in this opening shot is an allusion to his 
slumbering pod-enclosed body in 2199. Likewise, the cocoon of digital gadgets that surrounds 
Neo in this image mimics the totalised technological environment of the pod, suggesting the 
sense in which listening to music through headphones is different in degree, but not in essence, 
from receiving simulated sensations through an electrical port that plugs directly into your spinal 
cord. While the occipital plug presents a shocking image of the penetration of the nervous system 
by a technological apparatus, this image only literalises an underlying continuity between digital 
impulses and consciousness that exists whenever our senses are engaged in digital stimulation. 
Baudrillard, describing the phenomenology of hi-fi, describes it as a kind of Matrix world: “it is 
the simulation of a total environment that dispossesses one of even the minimal analytic 
perception constitutive of music’s charm…Something else fascinates…you: technical 
perfection” (Seduction 30 emphasis in original). Of course, “charm” is not the most apt word one 
would employ to describe the aesthetic effect aspired to by the genre of music Neo listens to, the 
staple musical genre of the Matrix world, techno music, which itself strives to replace musical 
“charm” with sub-cognitive fascination in its technical perfection. When Neo visits a club in the 
following scene, the techno music blares so powerfully that, even without headphones, it 
constitutes a total digital environment that is tactile as well as auditory. But for a movie with a 
distinctly Luddite premise, The Matrix fetishises the technological sensory environment 
represented by techno music. Not only is techno music represented as cool and hip (at the same 
time as it is presented as a metaphor for the technological dehumanisation of pod-dwelling), but 
also Neo’s prowess as a computer hacker is a kind of prerequisite to his ultimate ability to crack 
the code of the Matrix. Neo’s career as the nemesis of the machines begins not by rejecting 
technology, but by penetrating it. The information scrolling across Neo’s computer screen (and 
his flesh) in the opening scene is about Morpheus; it contains information about Neo’s own 
destiny. Upon waking up, his computer addresses him personally, directing him to find Trinity 
and to begin his quest of discovery. Of course, the rebels themselves all need to be adept 
computer geeks in order to hack into the Matrix and perpetrate their terrorist incursions. In Neo’s 
world, following the white rabbit of technology brings him into the real 2199, where he 
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discovers the truth that technology is a transcendently malicious force. For us in the “real 1999”, 
however, with no real techno-dystopia to act as background for our relationship to technology, 
the implication of this double valence in the question of technology—is it moral or immoral, is it 
a path to self-understanding or a tool of self-deception, is it empowering or castrating?—remains 
unresolved. While Neo transcends this ambiguity by exiting his illusory 1999, we in the “real 
1999” are left with the implosion of these two options. Of “hypertechnology without finality”, 
Baudrillard writes, “is it good or bad? We will never know. It is simply fascinating, though this 
fascination does not imply a value judgment?” (Simulacra and Simulation 119). In the same way 
that Neo is in the Matrix whether he listens to headphones or not, our world is also pervasively 
simulacral, making any particular Luddite pose futile and naïve. 
 
 
 
Neo’s digital flesh 
 
 
One piece of technology that is very important in the Matrix’s mythology is the 
telephone. The explosion of compact cell phones, a prominent feature of the 1990s lifeworld, 
finds its way into the film, in which cell phones are an important means of communication 
between people inside the Matrix and people in the real world, but a landline connection is 
necessary to bodily transfigure a person between the two planes. Of course, in terms of the logic 
of the Matrix, this detail makes no sense at all, since the wires of intra-matrical landline phones 
are just as insubstantial as the signals sent by cell phones. This plot point does, however, suggest 
a significant implication about the 1990s technoscape to its audience in the “real 1999”. As a 
ubiquitous symbol of technological progress, the cell phone in 1999 is in a unique position to 
serve as a symbol for technological progress as such, the objective correlative of the sense in 
which technological advancement seems to occur independently of any human decision-making 
process. The old-fashioned landline phones of the Matrix are capable of effectuating actual 
physical contact with real people in the real world, making it literally possible to “reach out and 
touch someone”, as the old AT&T advertisements used to say. The cell phone, on the other hand, 
provides a disorienting style of communication. When Neo is on the cell phone with Morpheus 
in the cubicle maze, he has no idea where Morpheus is, or where on earth he could possibly be to 
have an apparently god’s-eye-view of time and space. The placelessness of the interlocutor, 
moreover, redounds upon the cell phone user himself, as the question of where Morpheus might 
be is inseparable from the question of where Neo himself might be that his actions are so readily 
observable. This disorientation effect of cell phone communication is analogous to the films’ 
metaphorical insinuation that cell phones strand their users in the Matrix. As a symbol of the 
advancing technologies of virtualisation, cell phones—those same gadgets that we rely on with 
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increasing frequency in the “real 1999”—indicate that the future reconstitution of the world as a 
grand neural-interactive simulation is already underway, if not already definitively 
accomplished, in the “real 1999”. In fact, by 2199, the machines have overplayed their hand, 
making themselves less powerful through their establishment of themselves as humanity’s 
“Other”, an enemy that can be attacked. In the “real 1999”, the machines are more powerful, for 
there is no way of contesting them; they are integrated into the very texture of human reality in a 
way that the Matrix illusion can only simulate and metaphorise. 
 
Aside from any particular intra-matrical object or event, however, the total environment 
of the Matrix seems to reflect back to its 1999 audience a vision of reality that suggests the deep 
penetration of hyperreal ontology into the very fabric of time and space. For Baudrillard, 
hyperreality is not something we experience when we talk on the phone or watch television; the 
order of simulation affects all of perception at a structural level. The Matrix’s memorable bullet-
time sequences reflect that aspect of Baudrillard’s worldview that Bogard describes as a side-
effect of living “within the envelope of the repeated past”, namely, “time’s immolation, its 
journey into the digital void” (319). Not only is the bullet-time effect achieved by digitally 
manipulating photographic images, but the effect itself signifies the digitalised nature of the 
Matrix’s environment. This effect, though, so central to The Matrix’s marketing and legacy, has 
little or no meaning for the characters themselves; it exists exclusively for the benefit of the 
audience. The bullet-time sequence, used three times throughout the film, involves not only the 
slowing of the action, but also the rotation of the camera angle almost a full 360 degrees. The 
effect of these sequences on the audience is to pull at their sensory engagement with the film and 
twist the audience’s perception into the screen image. Temporally, the slow motion draws out 
suspense, causing the viewer to lean forward into the temporality of the filmic action. Spatially, 
the travelling camera carries our visual sense into the mise-en-scène of the image, giving us a 
360-degree view of the surrounding digital environment (digital both for Neo in the Matrix and 
for us viewing a computer-generated landscape), and also situates us bodily within the time and 
space of this world, creating as convincing an effect of transporting its audience into a cinematic 
ontological register as any two-dimensional image could conceivably achieve. Another 
thematically significant motif in the film is the pattern of concentric oscillations rippling across 
reflective surfaces, as in the mirror after Neo touches it with his finger or in the mirrored 
skyscraper façade after the helicopter crashes into it. As a phenomenon of physics closely 
associated with holography, the motif of concentric oscillations works within the Matrix to 
signify the virtuality of the intra-matrical environment. For the audience, however, the bizarre 
warping of images as they ripple across waveform reflecting surfaces accentuates the 
electromagnetic substratum of all perception, intra- and extra-matrical. Implicit in this 
recognition is a post-Helmholtzian understanding of human perception as an essentially 
biomechanical phenomenon. The machines, that is, have already colonised our self-
understanding; we are already simulated cybernetic appliances. If it is possible to hook the brain 
up to an artificial electronically-simulated world, it is only because our perceptual world is 
already electronically simulated in its very nature. Finally, the preoccupation with fate, in both 
the Matrix world and the real world of 2199, reflects a Baudrillardian temporality. Fatality is the 
signature time-sense of the hyperreal, and shares the same definition: “This is the very definition 
of fate: the precession of effects over their very causes. So all things happen before having 
happened” (Fatal Strategies 198). The aporia centralised around the Oracle—do her prophecies 
predict the future or do they cause it?—reflects a typically Baudrillardian implosion of cause and 
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effect: “an absorption of the radiating mode of causality” (Simulacra and Simulation 31). In 
simulated time, freedom itself is only a simulacral shimmer over a surface of digitised code. 
While the fatal temporality of the Matrix world would seem to diminish Neo’s heroic 
accomplishment (despite the film’s theme of choice, Trinity’s revelation of Neo’s status as The 
One suggests that he could not have done other than he did), it does contribute to the 
Baudrillardian atmosphere of The Matrix’s simulated 1999. 
 
 
 
Concentric oscillations in a mirrored surface 
 
 
In Simulacra and Simulation, originally published almost twenty years before the release 
of The Matrix, Baudrillard achieves the appropriately Baudrillardian accomplishment of seeming 
to defend his position against its future distortion by the narrative of the Wachowski brothers’ 
film. Whereas Neo was able to travel from the hyperreal world to another world from which he 
could view the illusory quality of what he had taken to be reality, “here…simulation is 
insuperable, unsurpassable, dull and flat, without exteriority—we will no longer even pass 
through to ‘the other side of the mirror’ [as Neo does], that was still the golden age of 
transcendence” (125). The likelihood that the Wachowski brothers were familiar with this 
passage (and many others like it) and deliberately chose either to ignore it or to dramatise its 
contradiction is bolstered by the manner in which they depict Baudrillard’s book itself in the 
film. The film does not show us the familiar, iconic edition of Simulacra and Simulation, the 
white rectangular paperback, but a strange mock-up: a blue hardcover with embossed lettering 
that looks about ten times as thick as the actual book. Neo opens the book at the essay “On 
Nihilism”, which is printed on the wrong side of the page; moreover, the book has been hollowed 
out for use as a secret storage area for illegal software. The writers seem to be fairly direct in 
admitting that the Baudrillard to which their film alludes is a distorted, eviscerated simulacrum 
of the “real” Baudrillard. (In fact, Neo’s copy of Simulacra and Simulation is itself one of the 
simulated objects in the Matrix programme, suggesting the accusation of many of Baudrillard’s 
critics that he is part of the hyperreal environment he professes to criticise.) The Wachowski 
brothers seem to be admitting their intention to stage a deceptive effigy of Baudrillardian 
concepts, requiring a thoughtful viewer to ask how The Matrix uses Baudrillardian ideas, rather 
than judging the film by whether or not it faithfully parrots them. Considering the film as a 
reflection of the “real 1999” provides a unique opportunity to observe the manner in which the 
film engages Baudrillardian concerns, and encourages its audience to recognise themselves in a 
Baudrillardian mirror. 
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